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A commentary on
Seeing changes: How familiarity alters our perception of change.
by Tovey, M., and Herdman, C. (2014). Vis. Cogn. 22, 214–238. doi: 10.1080/13506285.2014.894167
Sternberg (2001) defines processing modules as distinct parts that are separately modifiable—a
process is separately modifiable when each of its modules can be modified without effect on
other modules. Sequentially arranged process modules are “stages” and explanations aimed at
decomposing complex processes into stages are “stage models.” In this commentary, I look at one
issue that arises for Tovey and Herdman’s (2014) stage model of change perception. I argue that
Tovey and Herdman’s introduction of a “gating mechanism” complicates interpretation of their
model as a stage model. I use Tovey and Herdman’s model as a cautionary example for interpreting
stage models generally.
One aspect of stage models that is sometimes underappreciated is that the process modules
revealed by techniques such as the additive factors method are functions operating over epochs
of time rather than functional components operating in space. Process modules are actions rather
than actors (see, e.g., Townsend and Ashby, 1983; Townsend and Nozawa, 1995; Sternberg, 2001).
This feature of stage models is important, as it is sometimes tempting to assume that information
flow between process modules is also information flow between processing devices.
One issue with this way of thinking is that it can produce misleading accounts of how process
modules relate to processing devices. There aremany processor types that can carry out the same set
of processing stages. Several possible relations exist for even a three-stage process, for example. A
separate processor might carry out each process, the same processor might carry out every process,
or there be might some complex combination of the two, where one processor carries out two
processes and another processor carries out one process. To avoid confusion, stage models should
avoid discussion of processor devices where possible.
The slide between process and processor descriptions of stage models is easy to make.
Consider, for example, Tovey and Herdman (2014). Tovey and Herdman investigated the
effects of familiarity on change perception using a 2 × 5 × 2 factorial design. They examined
the effects of orientation (upright vs. inverted, set size (4, 7, 10, 13, 16) and change size
(Small vs. Large) across four different experiments. In line with Rensink (2000a,b, 2002,
2005), they suggested that change perception is divided into three process modules: a pre-
processing, feature extraction, and identification stage. Tovey and Herdman (2014, p. 232)
proposed that an interaction between change size and orientation and change size and stimulus
quality suggested that change size exerted an effect not only at the feature extraction stage
but also at the identification stage of change perception. This prompted them to propose a
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FIGURE 1 | Tovey and Herdman’s stage model.
“gating mechanism.” They claimed that when changes in size
are detected they are either passed on to the feature-extraction
stage (assuming they are large) or retained and verified at the
identification stage (assuming they are small). Figure 1 provides
an illustration.
Introduction of a gating mechanism, however, complicates
interpretation of Tovey and Herdman’s model as a serial stage
model. This is because it introduces a functional property into
the model. Process modules, at least traditionally understood,
are not the sorts of structures that possess functional properties
(e.g., the ability to channel or redirect information). They are
operations carried out over successive periods of time, not
physical structures with causal powers. The processor devices
that carry out process modules might have functional properties,
but the processing modules themselves, at least as informed by
techniques such as the additive factors method, are neutral with
respect to such questions (see Sternberg, 2001).
Tovey and Herdman have unduly inferred processor
properties on top of process modules. Though Tovey and
Herdman’s model may be correct, inclusion of functional
properties complicates interpretation of the model as a serial
stage model. It is not that the results of Tovey and Herdman are
suspect, but their interpretation of the model.
Another reason to think that Tovey and Herdman’s model has
slid into discussion of processing devices is the diagram provided
by the model. Replicated in Figure 1, Tovey and Herdman’s
model places change size outside of any processing stage, residing
after feature extraction but before identification. This seems to
change the structure of the diagram from a flowchart to a circuit
diagram, as the arrows no longer represent a succession in time
of a series of processes but the flow of information from one
processor to another. The problem, as Sternberg (2001) points
out, is that since process modules are events in time they need
to be strung together end to end, as in a flowchart. When
represented as a circuit diagram—that is, as describing how
processing devices are connected—stage models can misleading
suggest that the process modules are, in fact, also processing
devices arranged in a serial sequence; an interpretation, as
mentioned, that fails to acknowledge the variety of possible
relationships that might obtain between process modules and
processing devices.
Tovey and Herdman might, in response, point out that
change size is conceived of as factor, and that therefore its
inclusion outside of the stage merely denotes where its effect
is felt. Though, I am sensitive to this interpretation, my worry
is that it does not satisfactorily resolve the issue. The gating
mechanism is still conceived of as the change size. It therefore
denotes the redirection of information from one stage to
another, not only how change size influences time duration.
If the model represented the effect of change size, it would
have to effect the period of time as represented by the box,
not the passage or succession of time as represented by the
arrows.
The slide between process/processor interpretations of stage
models is subtle but important. In using Tovey and Herdman’s
model as a representative example, I have tried to highlight
the cognizance required to avoid interpretative and conceptual
confusion within discussions of stage models. One way to see the
current commentary, then, is not so much as a criticism but as a
cautionary tale for future research.
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